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This  paper  provides  an  analog  to  the  aggregate  monotonicity  condition 
introduced  by  Samuelson  and  Zhang  [J.  .&on.  Theory,  19921  in  a  study  of 
continuous  dynamics.  Our  condition  guarantees  that  limit  points  of  discrete 
selection  dynamics  are  rationalizable  strategies. We  show  that  the  condition  will  be 
satisfied  by  the  discrete  replicator  dynamic  if  the  population  does  not  change 
rapidly.  These  results  reconcile  the  Samuelson-Zhang  theorem,  which  implies  that 
limit  points  of continuous  replicator  dynamics  must  be  rationalizable,  with  an 
example  of Dekel  and  Scotchmer  [J.  Bon.  Theory,  19921, which  shows  that  limit 
points  of the  discrete  replicator  dynamic  may place  positive  probability  on  strictly 
dominated  stategies. Journal  of  Economic  Literature  Classification  Numbers:  C72, 
c73.  0  1992  Academic  Press,  Inc. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
This  paper  presents  a  condition  on  discrete  game  dynamics  which 
guarantees  that  limiting  outcomes  must  survive  iterated  deletion  of strictly 
dominated  strategies.  We  are  motivated  by  two  recent  studies.  Samuelson 
and  Zhang  [9]  have  given  conditions  under  which  the  limit  points  of 
continuous  game  dynamics  must  be  rationalizable.  To  prove  their  result, 
they  introduce  a  monotonicity  condition  that  is  satisfied  by  the  replicator 
dynamic  of  evolutionary  game  theory.  In  contrast,  Dekel  and  Scotchmer 
[2]  have  shown  by  example  that  the  discrete  replicator  dynamic  need  not 
eliminate  a  strategy  that  is  strictly  dominated  by  a  mixture  of  the  other 
strategies.  We  wish  to  reconcile  these  results  by  providing  conditions  under 
which  discrete  dynamics  rule  out  dominated  strategies  and  relating  those 
conditions  to  the  discrete  replicator  dynamic. 
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We  obtain  the  following  results.  First,  we  provide  an  analog  to  the 
Samuelson-Zhang  condition;  our  assumption  guarantees  that  limit  points 
of  discrete  selection  dynamics  are  rationalizable  strategies.  Second,  we 
show that  the  condition  will  be  satisfied  by  the  discrete  replicator  dynamics 
if  the  population  does  not  change  rapidly.  These  results  help  to  relate  the 
Samuelson-Zhang  theorem  to  the  Dekel-Scotchmer  example. 
Section  2  of  the  paper  introduces  the  basic  model.  Section  3  examines 
the  Dekel-Scotchmer  example.  Section  4  discusses  the  monotonicity 
assumptions  needed  in  the  continuous  and  discrete  models  and  explains  the 
relationship  to  each  other  and  to  the  replicator  dynamic.  Section  5 proves 
a  result  that  gives  conditions  under  which  limit  points  of discrete  selection 
dynamics  must  be rationalizable. 
Our  framework  and  main  result  simply  translate  the  Samuelson  and 
Zhang  result  to  a discrete  setting.  We  use their  notation  whenever  possible. 
2.  PRELIMINARIES 
We  deal  with  a finite  two-player  game.’  We  let  I  be  the  set  of n,  pure 
strategies  of player  1; J  denotes  player  2’s  set of  n,  pure  strategies.  Player 
k’s  payoff  function  is denoted  by  rrk(i,  j)  for  (i, j)  E Ix  J.  Let  S”  denote  the 
standard  (n  -  1)-dimensional  simplex.  We  extend  rrk( .)  to  the  space  of 
mixed  strategies  S”’  x SB2 in  the  usual  fashion  by  linearity.  Hence,  for 
(x,  y) E S”’  x S”l,  nllk(x, v)  =  Cy’r  C;s,  rck(i, j)xivj;  we  will  identify  the 
pure  strategy  i  with  the  degenerate  distribution  that  places  probability  one 
on  the  ith  pure  strategy.  In  keeping  with  the  usual  framework  for 
evolutionary  game  theory,  it  is  useful  to  imagine  that  there  are  infinite 
populations  of players  who  take  on  the  roles  of player  1 and  2;  that  players 
from  each  population  are  randomly  and  anonymously  paired;  and  that  all 
individuals  play  pure  strategies  so  that  an  element  of  S*  represents  the 
fraction  of members  of the  population  that  play  each  pure  strategy. 
Samuelson  and  Zhang  consider  continuous  dynamics  determined  by 
functions  (f,  g),  where 
ii=fi(x,  y)  i=  1, .  .  .  . n,  and  jj=gj(x,  y)  j=  1, .  .  .  . n,  (1) 
that  satisfy,  for  all  (x,  JJ) E S”1  x S”*, 
(Cl)  f(  .)  and  g( .)  are  Lipschitz  continuous, 
(C2)  Cli,f,(x,  Y)=O=C~=l  gjcx,  y), 
’ We  choose  to  work  with  two-player  games  because  that  is  the  standard  setting  for 
evolutionary  dynamics  and  is  the  context  for  the  Dekel-Scotchmer  and  Samuelson-Zhang 
papers.  Our  results  generalize  in  a  straightforward  manner  to  n-player  games. LIMITS  OF  SELECTION  DYNAMICS  409 
(C3)  for  all  XE  S”‘,  if xi  =  0,  then  fi(X,  y)  >  0, 
(C4)  for  all  y E P,  if yj =  0,  then  gj(x,  y) >  0,  and 
(CR)  lim.,  + o [fi(x,  YVXJ  and  limv,,o  Cg,(x, Y)/Yjl  exist and  are 
finite. 
The  first  condition  is  the  standard  regularity  condition  needed  to 
guarantee  the  existence  and  uniqueness  of solutions  to  the  dynamic  system 
(1)  for  any  initial  condition.  Conditions  (C2)-(C4)  guarantee  that  the  path 
of solutions  stays  within  the  strategy  simplices.  (CR)  is a  regularity  condi- 
tion  which  implies  that  growth  rates  fi(x,  y)/x,  and  gj(x,  y)/yj  can  be 
extended  continuously  to  the  boundary  of S”’  x Sn2; we shall  denote  these 
extensions,  given  by  the  limits  in  (CR),  by  fi(O,  y)/O  and  g,(x,  0)/O.  This 
condition  prevents  strategies  that  are  present  in  the  population  from  being 
eliminated  in  finite  time.  Samuelson  and  Zhang  also  impose  another 
condition  that  is crucial  for  their  result  on  rationalizability.  We  discuss  this 
condition  in  Section  4. 
We  will  instead  look  at  discrete  dynamics  defined  by  continuous 
functions  (F,  G),  where  F:  S”’  x Sn2 +  S”’  and  G:  S”’  x Sn2 +  Sn2 and 
x,(t+  l)=Fi(x(t),  y(t))  i=  1, .  .  .  . n,  and 
yj(t+  l)=Gj(x(t),  y(t))  j=  1, .  .  .  . n2. 
(2) 
(Dl)  If  xi>O,  then  F,(x,  y)>O  and  ify,>O,  then  G,(x,  y)>O. 
(DR  1  lim.,  + o [Fi(x,  y)/xiJ  and  lim,,,  [Gj(x,  y)/y,]  exist  and  are 
positive  and  finite. 
(DR)  plays  the  same  role  as (CR). 
We  wish  to  know  whether  the  set of limit  points  of a solution  (x(t),  y(r)) 
to  (1)  or  (2)  places  positive  probability  on  dominated  strategies.  First  we 
make  precise  our  definitions. 
Strategy  x’ ES”’  is  strictly  dominated in  M,  c  S”’  relative  to  M2  c  S”’  if 
there  exists  XE  M,  such  that  rc,(x,  y) >  X,(X’,  y)  for  all  YE M,.  Let 
D,(M,,  Mz)  be  the  set  of  mixed  strategies  in  M,  that  are  not  strictly 
dominated  in  M,  relative  to  Mz.  The  strategy  x E S”’  survives  strict  iterated 
admissibility  (SIA)  if  there  exist  sequences  of  the  form  S”’  =  M,,, 
M  ii,  .  .  .  . Ml.  and  Sn2 =  Mzo,  Mzl,  .  .  .  . M,,  where  MI,,+  1  = D,(M,,,,  M,,) 
and  Mzn+  1  =dz(M1,,  M,,)  for  n =  1, .  .  .  . T-  1, with  M,,=B,(M,,,  M2=) 
and  M,,=  Dz(M,,,  M,,)  and  with  x E M,  T. Similar  definitions  apply  for 
player  2. 
(x*,  y*)  is  said  to  be a  limit  point  of a  solution  (x(t),  y(t))  to  (1)  or  (2) 
if  there  exists  an  increasing  sequence  of  times,  { tn};=  i,  such  that 
lim,  + m  (x(t,),  y(t,))  =  (x*,  y*).  According  to  this  definition  a  limit  point 
is  the  limit  of a  sequence  of points  generated  by  the  dynamics. 410  CABRALES  AND  SOBEL 
Pearce  [S]  shows  that  in  two-player  games  the  pure  strategies  that 
survive  SIA  coincide  with  the  set of pure  strategies  that  are  rationalizable 
(Bernheim  [ 1]  and  Pearce  [8])  in  the  set  of all  mixed  strategies.  We  will 
say  that  a  solution  (x(t),  y(t))  to  (1)  or  (2)  avoids  nonrationalizable 
strategies  if all  limit  points  survive  SIA. 
3.  DISCUSSION  OF  THE  DEKEL-SCOTCHMER  EXAMPLE 
Dekel  and  Scotchmer  [2]  present  an  example  in  which  for  almost  all 
initial  conditions,  limit  points  of paths  generated  by  the  discrete  replicator 
dynamic  place  positive  probability  on  a  strategy  that  is  strictly  dominated 
by  a  mixture  of the  other  strategies.  Since  the  theorem  of Samuelson  and 
Zhang  guarantees  that  this  cannot  occur  for  the  continuous  replicator 
dynamic,  the  example  is  puzzling.  We  briefly  discuss  the  example  in  this 
section. 
The  example  is given  in  Fig.  1.’  For  both  players  an  equal  mixture  of the 
first  three  strategies  dominates  the  fourth  strategy.  To  discuss  stability,  we 
define  the  replicator  dynamic.  The  continuous  replicator  dynamic  (S*,  g*) 
takes  the  form 
fi*(x,  Y)‘C7-c,(&  Y)-~,(-%  Y)lXi 
and 
gi*(x, Y)  = Cn,(x,  A -  n,(x, VII  Yji 
in  the  discrete  replicator  dynamic  (F*,  G*),  F*(x,  y) E  x+f*(x,  y)/ni(x,  JJ) 
and  G*(x,  v) -y  +  g*(x,  y)/7r2(x,  y)  so  that,  for  example,  x,(t  +  1) - 
xi(t)=fi*(x,  y)/ni(x,  y).  Friedman  [3],  Hofbauer  and  Sigmund  [S],  and 
Nachbar  [7]  discuss  the  replicator  dynamic. 
Dekel  and  Scotchmer  show that  for  any  dynamic  path  x(t)  that  satisfies 
the  discrete  replicator  dynamic  with  x(O)  completely  mixed,  x4(t)  converges 
to  zero  if  and  only  if  x,(O)  =x,(0)=x,(O).  Hence,  for  almost  all  initial 
*Note  that  the  game  is symmetric.  Dekel  and  Scotchmer  analyze  the  game  as if there  is 
only  one  population  of players,  and  analyze  symmetric  dynamics.  While  Samuelson-Zhang 
and  we  explicitly  allow  asymmetric  dynamics,  this  difference  cannot  account  for  the  different 
results:  Strategies  evolving  according  to  asymmetric  replicator  dynamics  of a symmetric  game 
starting  from  a  symmetric  initial  condition  are  identical  to  symmetric  replicator  dynamics. 
This  observation  follows  because  the  path  of the  asymmetric  replicator  dynamic  of a  sym- 
metric  game  starting  from  a symmetric  initial  condition  is symmetric  for  all  time.  We  would 
expect  stochastic  dynamics  to  differ  depending  on  whether  there  where  one  or  two  popula- 
tions  of players.  This  difference  is not  captured  by the  deterministic  replicator  dynamic,  but 
may  be  captured  in  part  by the  difference  between  the  static  ESS  stability  conditions  for 
symmetric  and  asymmetric  contests. LIMITS  OF  SELECTION  DYNAMICS 
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FIGURE  1 
conditions,  the  dominated  strategy  is  not  eliminated  in  the  limit.3  Their 
argument  is  subtle,  but  it  hinges  on  two  observations.  First,  the  discrete 
replicator  dynamic  restricted  to  the  game  determined  by  the  upper  three- 
by-three  submatrix  of  Fig.  1  (the  rock-scissors-paper  game)  must 
approach  the  boundary  of C,  =  {x  E S4 : x4 =  O}.  Second,  if a dynamic  path 
has a limit  point  on  C,,  then  x4 does  not  converge  to  zero.  The  first  obser- 
vation  follows  standard  analyses  of the  rock-scissors-paper  game  (see, for 
example,  Hofbauer  and  Sigmund  [ 5,  p.  1341  and  Weissing  [ 11 I).  The 
second  observation  follows  (loosely)  by  noting  that  if a dynamic  path  does 
approach  the  boundary  of .X0, then  x4  will  grow  because,  while  it  is not  a 
best  response  to  the  population  strategy,  it  does  better  than  the  population 
average. 
Samuelson  and  Zhang’s  result  implies  that  all  limit  points  of  the 
continuous  replicator  dynamic  (that  start  from  the  interior  of the  strategy 
simplex)  are  contained  in  LCO.  What  accounts  for  the  difference?  Here  we 
offer  brief  comments.  The  next  two  sections  of the  paper  provide  a  general 
treatment.  First,  continuous  replicator  dynamics  applied  to  the  rock- 
scissors-paper  game  determined  by  the  upper  three-by-three  submatrix  in 
Fig.  1 do  not  approach  the  boundary.4  For  this  reason,  after  a finite  inter- 
val,  the  population  does  not  return  to  states  in  which  the  dumb  fourth 
strategy  is better  than  average. 
3 Dekel  and  Scotchmer  modify  the  replicator  dynamic  to  allow  inheritance  of  mixed 
strategies.  For  this  specification  they  prove  that  limit  points  of  the  discrete  replicator  dynamic 
cannot  by  dominated. 
4 Continuous  replicator  dynamics  in  the  rock-scissors-paper  game  approach  the  boundary 
if  (all  other  numbers  held  constant)  the  payoffs  that  are  equal  to  2.35  in  Fig.  1  are  less  than 
2  (see  Hofbauer  and  Sigmund  [S,  p.  1613).  In  this  case,  however,  the  fourth  strategy  is  not 
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Second,  we  note  that  if  a  constant  is  added  to  each  of  the  entries  in 
Fig.  1,  then  continuous  replicator  dynamic  does  not  change,  but  the  dis- 
crete  dynamic  does  change.  Indeed,  if C>  20/7  is added  to  all  of the  entries 
in  Fig.  1, then  (l/3,  l/3,  l/3)  is  a globally  asymptotically  stable  strategy  of 
the  rock-scissors-paper  game  under  the  discrete  replicator  dynamic;  both 
discrete  and  continuous  replicator  dynamics  converge  to  (l/3,  l/3,  l/3,0)  in 
this  case.  Discrete  replicator  dynamics  need  not  behave  like  continuous 
replicator  dynamics  when  payoffs  (fitnesses)  are  low;  they  have 
qualitatively  similar  properties  if a sufficiently  large  constant  is added  to  all 
payoffs.5 
4.  MONOTONICITY  FOR  DISCRETE  AND  CONTINUOUS  DYNAMICS 
In  this  section  we introduce  the  monotonicity  condition  needed  for  our 
result  and  relate  it  to  the  Samuelson-Zhang  monotonicity  condition.  We 
provide  a  sense  in  which  the  conditions  are  equivalent  when  the  time 
between  periods  in  a  discrete  dynamic  converges  to  zero.  We  discuss  the 
special  case  of  the  replicator  dynamic.  Finally,  we  point  out  that  there 
is  a  correspondence  between  the  conditions  in  the  following  sense:  Any 
regular  continuous  dynamic  that  satisfies  the  Samuelson-Zhang  condition 
maps  to  a  regular  discrete  dynamic  that  satisfies  our  condition,  and 
conversely. 
Samuelson  and  Zhang  introduce  a  condition,  which  they  call  aggregate 
monotonicity,  that.  combined  with  (Cl)  through  (C4)  and  (CR)  implies 
that  continuous  selection  dynamics  avoid  nonrationalizable  strategies.6  The 
regular  selection  dynamic  (f,  g)  satisfies  aggregate monotonicity  if 
(AMI  ~,(Ls Y)  >  ncI(~‘,  Y)  implies  CYL, (Pi -PI)Cfi(x,  Y)lxil  >  0 
and n,(x, q) > n,(x, 4’) implies  CyZ_  1  (qj-qj)Cgj(x,  y)/yjl  > 0. 
’  The  fact  that  adding  a  positive  constant  to  payoffs  changes  the  qualitative  behavior  of  the 
discrete  replicator  dynamic  is  not  troubling  for  biological  applications;  relative  reproduction 
rates  should  not  be  invariant  with  respect  to  adding  constants.  It  is  disturbing  for  economic 
applications  if  players  are  expected  utility  maximizers.  We  see  no  reason,  however,  why  adap- 
tive  behavior  of  economic  agents  must  obey  invariance  properties  derived  from  the  assump- 
tion  of  full  rationality.  On  the  other  hand,  as  Eddie  Dekel-Tabak  has  pointed  out  to  us,  some 
of  the  stories  that  can  be  used  to  motivate  studying  the  replicator  dynamic  in  economic 
contexts  suggest  that  dynamics  should  be  invariant  with  respect  to  all  increasing  monotonic 
transformations.  It  is  unlikely  that  strictly  dominated  strategies  are  assigned  probability  zero 
in  all  limits  of  increasing  monotonic  transformations  of  the  continuous  replicator  dynamic. 
6 Samuelson  and  Zhang  introduce  another,  easier  to  satisfy,  monotonicity  condition,  the 
requirement  that  a,  (i,  y)  >  X,(/C,  y)  implies  that  Ji(x,  y)/x,>JJx,  y)/xk  and  show  that  this 
condition  implies that  regular  selection  dynamics  avoid  strategies  that  are  dominated  by  pure 
strategies.  The  condition  and  result  carry  over  with  no  changes  to  the  discrete  case.  Friedman 
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Similarly,  we  say  that  the  regular  discrete  selection  dynamic  (F,  G) 
satisfies  aggregate  log  monotonicity  if 
(LM)  nl(p,  Y)>~,(P’,  Y) implies C?1=,  (~i-~I)logCFi(x,  ~)lxtl>O 
and  n,(x,  q)  >  X,(X,  q’)  implies  C;‘=  I  (qj -  qj)  log[G,(x,  y)/yj]  >  0. 
(LM)  is  the  assumption  that  we need  in  order  to  prove  our  main  result. 
While  it  does  not  appear  to  be  a direct  translation  of (AM)  to  the  discrete 
dynamic,  (AM)  and  (LM)  serve  identical  purposes.  Consider  the  function 
E(x,  p)  EC?‘,  pi  log  i.  It  is  straightforward  to  check  that  the  first  condi- 
tion  of  (AM)  holds  along  a solution  to  ( 1) if and  only  if 
dE(x,  p)/dt  >  dE(  x,  p’)/dt  if  x,(P,  Y)  >  x,(P’,  Y),  (3) 
and  the  first  condition  of (LM)  holds  if and  only  if 
E(x(t  +  11, PI  -  E(x(t),  P)  >  E(x(t  +  I),  P’)  -  E(x(t),  P’) 
if  ~1(~y  Y)  >  ~l(~‘v  Y).  (4) 
Conditions  (3)  and  (4)  assert  that  on  a  solution  path  in  both  the 
continuous  and  discrete  dynamics,  E(  .)  grows  faster  for  better  strategies. 
In  order  to  see how  discrete  dynamics  change  as  the  interval  between 
adjustments  shrink,  begin  with  a system  of the  form 
i(t)  = h(z).  (5) 
Let 
H(z;  A) =  z +  h(z)A.  (6) 
The  difference  equation  z(t  +  d)  =  H(z(  t);  d)  corresponds  to  (5)  since 
[z(t  +A)-z(t)]/A  =/r(z)  for  all  A.  Assume  (by  analogy  to  (DR))  that  for 
each  i,  lim  .,+oCHik  AYzil  exists  and  is  finite  so  that  we  can  extend 
H,(z;  A)/zi  to  the  boundary  of  the  mixed-strategy  simplex  by  continuity. 
Since  log(  1 +x)  is  approximately  equal  to  x  when  x  is  close  to  zero,  if 
CyL,  (pi-p:)[hi(z)/zi]  >O  then  there  exists  A,>0  such  that  for  all 
A E (0, A,,),  Cy’i  (pi  -pi)  log[H,(z;  A)/zi]  >  0. Moreover,  A,  can  be  taken 
to  be  independent  of  z.  It  follows  that  aggregate  monotonicity  for  the 
continuous  dynamic  implies  aggregate  log  monotonicity  of  the  discrete 
dynamic  for  sufficiently  small  period  length. 
Since  our  primary  objective  is  to  reconcile  results  relating  to  the  dis- 
crete  and  continuous  replicator  dynamic,  we will  study  that  case in  a  bit 
more  detail.  It  is  straightforward  to  verify  that  the  continuous  replicator 
dynamic  satisfies  (AM);  the  Dekel-Scotchmer  example,  combined  with 414  CABRALES  AND  SOBEL 
Proposition  2  (which  we state  and  prove  in  the  next  section)  demonstrates 
that  the  discrete  replicator  dynamic  need  not  satisfy  (LM).’ 
Now  imagine  that  the  period  length  shrinks.  A  natural  interpretatron  is 
that  if  the  period  length  is  A,  then  only  the  fraction  A  of  the  population 
reproduces  in  proportion  to  its  fitness;  the  remainder  of  the  population 
lives  on  in  its  past  composition.  In  this  case, the  relationship  between  the 
population  distribution  of strategies  at  consecutive  time  periods  is 
x;(t+A)-xi(t)=(l-A)O+A[n,(i,y(t)) 
- n1  CxCt)3  .Y(t))lXi(f)/711  CxCt),  Ytt)h  (7) 
where  the  first  term  on  the  right  hand  side  of  (7)  reflects  the  assumption 
that  the  fraction  (1 -A)  of  the  population  does  not  change,  while  the 
second  term  on  the  right  hand  side  reflects  the  assumption  that  the 
remaining  fraction  of  the  population  changes  according  to  the  replicator 
equation.  Dividing  both  sides  of Eq.  (7)  by  x,(t)  we obtain 
which  is  a  special  case  of  the  transformations  given  by  (6)  that  we  used 
before  (for  player  1  let  hi(x,  y) =  { rc, (i,  y)/rcl  (x,  y) -  1 } xi).  Hence,  since 
the  continuous  replicator  dynamic  always  satisfies  (AM),  the  discrete 
replicator  dynamic  will  satisfy  (LM)  when  the  time  between  periods  is 
sufftciently  short. 
For  the  replicator  dynamic  there  is  another  way  to  see the  relationship 
between  continuous  and  discrete  dynamics.  Add  a  large  positive  constant 
C  to  all  payoffs.  Doing  so  does  not  changef*(  -),  but  it  increases  rtl(  .)  by 
C.  It  follows  that  the  ratiof*(x,  y)/rrl(x,  JJ) can  be  made  arbitrarily  close 
to  zero  with  the  addition  of a large  enough  constant.  That  is,  one  can  find 
a constant  C  large  enough  so  that  if  C  is added  to  all  payoffs,  then  (AM) 
implies  (LM);  hence  (LM)  is satisfied  for  the  replicator  dynamics  if we add 
a  sufficiently  large  constant  to  all  payoffs.  Adding  a  constant  to  all  of the 
payoffs  has  a  natural  interpretation  in  the  biological  context.  Here  the 
payoffs  represent  fitnesses.  If  the  strategies  chosen  in  the  game  make  only 
a  small  contribution  to  relative  fitness,  then  different  strategies  will  not 
grow  rapidly  in  a  time  period.  In  this  case  the  discrete  dynamic  behaves 
like  the  continuous  dynamic.* 
’  Proposition  2 assumes (DR),  which  does  not  hold  for  the  discrete  replicator  dynamic  in 
the  Dekel-Scotchmer  example  of Fig. 1. Adding  a small  positive  constant  to  all  of the  payoffs 
in  Fig.  1  allows  the  discrete  replicator  dynamic  to  satisfy (DR)  for  the  game  without 
destroying  the  qualitative  properties  of limiting  behavior  in  the example.  Hence  it  is the  failure 
of aggregate  log  monotonicity,  not  the  failure  of regularity,  that  leads  to  the  possibility  that 
dominated  strategies  are  limits  of the  discrete  replicator  dynamic. 
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There  is a one-to-one  relationship  between  discrete  dynamics  that  satisfy 
aggregate  log  monotonicity  and  continuous  dynamics  that  satisfy  aggregate 
monotonicity.  Given  any  continuous  dynamic  (A  g)  define  the  log- 
associated  discrete  dynamic  (F,  G)  by  Fi(x,  y) =  w(x,  y)xieJ’“‘Y)‘xl  and 
Gj(x,  y)  =  p(x,  y)  yje  Gcx.Y)‘-b, where  w(x,  y)  and  ~(x,  y)  are  normaliza- 
tions;  0(x,  y)  =  [C/k,  xie/‘(“,-“““‘]  -’  and  ~(x,  y) E  [CT=  i  yjeQ(z;*y’Lb] -‘. 
It  is clear  that  (f,  g)  satisfy  (CR)  if and  only  if the  associated  (F,  G)  satisfy 
(DR).  Also,  the  following  proposition  is an  immediate  consequence  of the 
definitions. 
PROPOSITION  1.  The  continuous  dynamic  (f,  g)  satisfies  aggregate 
monotonicity  if  and  only  if  the  log-associated  discrete  dynamic  (F,  G) 
satisfies  aggregate  log  monotonicity. 
Let  (f*,  g*)  denote  the  continuous  replicator  dynamics.  Theorem  3  in 
Samuelson  and  Zhang  shows  that  (f,  g)  is  a  regular,  aggregate  monotone 
continuous  dynamic  if  and  only  if  fi(x,  y) =  1(x,  y)f,*(x,  y)  and 
gj(x,  y)  =B(x,  y)gi*(x,  y)  for  A( .)  and  p( .)  continuous  and  positive.’ 
Combined  with  Proposition  1,  we  have  a  characterization  of  the  set  of 
regular,  aggregate  log  monotone  discrete  dynamics:  They  are  simply  the 
discrete  dynamics  log-associated  with  multiples  of  continuous  replicator 
dynamics.  As  we use this  characterization  in  the  next  section,  it  is useful  to 
state  it  separately. 
COROLLARY.  The  discrete  dynamic  (F,  G)  satisjies  log  aggregate 
monotonicity  if  and  only  if  there  exist  positive  and  continuous  functions 
w(  .),  p(e),  A( .)  and  fi(  .)  on  S”’  x P  such  that  log[F,(x,  y)/x,]  = 
4x,  Y)C~l(iy Y)  -  nI(x,  ~11 +  log 4x,  Y)  and 
Bb-, Y)C~~(X,  j)  -  ~(4  Y)I  + loi3 144  Y) 
log  CGj  (x3 Y  )/Yjl  = 
In  the  corollary  o(  .) and  p( .)  are normalizations  that  guarantee  that  the 
dynamics  satisfy  F: S”’  x Sn2 +  S”’  and  G. S”’  x Sn2 +  Snz.  If  1(x,  y) = 
p(x,  y) =  1,  then  F(  .)  and  G( .)  are  the  log-associated  dynamics  derived 
from  the  continuous  replicator  dynamic. 
’  Samuelson  and  Zhang’s  Theorem  3  only  claims  that  if  (f,  g)  is  a  regular,  aggregate 
monotone  continuous  dynamic  then  x  (x,  y)  =,4(x,  y)  f,*(x,  y)  and  g,(x,  y)  =  j?(x,  y)  g,?(x,  y) 
for  A(  .)  and  b(  .)  positive.  Continuity  of  I(  .)  and  B(  .)  follow  from  the  continuity  and 
regularity  of  (J  g)  and  (/*,  g*).  The  converse  implication  follows  immediately  from  the 
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5.  AGGREGATE  LOG  MONOTONE  DISCRETE  DYNAMICS 
AVOID  DOMINATED  STRATEGIES 
Proposition  2  states  that  every  limit  point  of  a  regular,  aggregate  log 
monotone  dynamic  must  be  an  optimal  response  to  some  mixed  strategy  of 
the  other  player.  Moreover,  the  mixed  strategy  can  be  taken  to  be  a  limit 
of averages  of strategies  played  in  the  past.  In  particular,  if a pure  strategy 
is  strictly  dominated  then  it  must  receive  zero  weight  in  the  limit  of any 
regular,  aggregate  log  monotonic  selection  dynamic  that  starts  from  an 
interior  point. 
The  carrier  of  a  mixed  strategy  U, denoted  C(U),  is  the  set  of  all  pure 
strategies  it  gives  positive  probability. 
PROPOSITION  2.  Let  (F,  G)  be  a  regular,  aggregate  log  monotonic  selec- 
tion  dynamic.  Zf  (x(t),  y(t))  is  an  evolutionary  path  with  (x(O),  y(0)) 
completely  mixed  and  (x*,  y*)  is  a  limit  point  of  (x(t),  y(t)),  then  there 
exist  subsequences  {s,}  and  {t,  >  of  the positive  integers;  a  constant  K  and 
positive  weights  cr(s;  s,)  and  P(t;  t,)  for  s =  0, 1, .  .  .  . s,  and  t =  0, 1, .  .  .  . t,, 
such  that  for  all  n,  IF&,’  a(.~; s,)  =  C>:t  j?(t;  t,)  =  1,  cc(s;  s,)  <  K/s, 
and  B(t;  t,)  <  K/t,;  and  (X, J)  such  that  X =  lim,,,  C;:O1  cr(s;  s,)x(t), 
j=lim  n-rco CL’  P(t;  t,)  y(t),  and 
x1(&  J)>zl(x,  j)  forall  XES”’  and  iEC(x*)  (8) 
and 
TT~(x,~)>~~(%,  y)  foraN  YES”>  and  j~C(y*).  (9) 
Proof:  We  prove  (8).  Since  x~(T)/x~(O)=~~~~  xi(t+  1)/x,(t)= 
LIT::  Fi(X(t),  Y(t))/Xi(t), 
l”gCxi(T)lxi’(T)l  -logCxi(o)lxi’(o)l 
T-l 
By  (LM)  and  the  corollary,  there  exists  A( .)  such  that  the  right-hand  side 
of (10)  is equal  to  CT:,i  1(x(t),  y(t))[7c1(i,  y(t))-z,(i’,  y(t))].  Hence  (10) 
implies,  for  all  i  and  i’, 
T-l 
=  1  4x(t),  y(t))Cnl(i  y(t))  -  n,(i’,  y(t))l.  (11) 
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Let  /i(T)  =Cf:t  J.(x(t),  y(t))/T.  Since  A( .)  is continuous  and  positive  on 
S”’  x S”*  it  attains  its  positive  maximum  and  minimum  values  M  and  m  so 
that 
M>A(T)>m>O.  (12) 
Define  p(r;  T)  =  2(x(t),  y(t))/(  7’/i(  T));  by  (12)  and  the  definition  of  /i(  .), 
p( .)  is  positive,  P(t;  T)  <  M/[mT],  and  CT:,’  fl(t;  l,)  =  1.  Define 
j(T)  z  Cf_-,’  fl( t;  T)  y(t);  using  linearity  of R I (. ),  we can  rewrite  (11)  as 
{logCx;(T)lx;~(T)l  -l~~C~i(O)/~~~(O)l}/T 
=NT)Cn,(i,  Y(T))-~,(i’,j(T))l.  (13) 
By  the  definition  of x*,  there  exists  E >  0  such  that  it  is  possible  to  find  a 
subsequence  of  T=  1,2,  .  .  .  .  denoted  by  {rn},  for  which  x,(t,)  >  E  for  all 
ie  C(x*).  By  compactness,  it  is  possible  to  select  this  subsequence  so  that 
i.F(fJl  and  CN&J>  converge  as n  approaches  infinity.  Denote  these limits 
by  jj  and  A*.  Taking  limits  in  (13)  (  using  xj(t)e  [0,  l]  and  x,(O)>O)  it 
follows  that  if  i~C(x*),  then  O<n*[n,(i,  y)-rrl(i’,  jj)]  with  equality  if 
I’m  C(x*).  Since  /i*  >O  by  (12),  (8)  holds.  Similar  logic  establishes  (9). 
The  proof  of Proposition  2 uses techniques  found  in  Schuster,  Sigmund, 
Hofbauer,  and  Wolff  [lo]  who  prove  that  time  averages  of  periodic 
solutions  to  the  replicator  equation  are  Nash  equilibria.  Note  that  the 
proof  does  not  use the  assumption  that  there  are  only  two  players. 
While  (LM)  provides  a  sufficient  condition  for  a  dynamic  to  avoid 
dominated  strategies,  it  is  not  a  necessary  condition.  In  particular, 
dynamics  that  only  increase  the  probability  on  strategies  that  respond 
optimally  to  the  opponent’s  recent  actions  need  not  satisfy  (AM)  or  (LM); 
dynamics  in  this  class  must  avoid  strictly  dominated  strategies,  however. 
Gul  [4]  and  Milgrom  and  Roberts  [6]  show  that  limit  points  of 
adjustment  processes  in  this  class must  be  rationalizable. 
We  can  use Proposition  2 to  show that  selection  dynamics  are consistent 
with  adaptive  learning  in  the  sense of Milgrom  and  Roberts  [6].  Given  a 
set  of  strategies  R,  let  U,‘(R)  be  the  set  of  s-undominated  strategies  for 
player  n  given  that  opponents  are  using  strategies  in  R.  A  sequence  of 
strategies  {xn(t)}  is consistent  with  e-adaptive  learning  by  player  n if for  all 
i  there  exists  T  such  that  for  all  t >  T,  x,(t)  E UIIE( {x(s)  : ids  <  t}).  It  is 
consistent  with  adaptive  learning  if it  is  consistent  with  s-adaptive  learning 
for  all  E >  0.  When  {x(t)>  is  a path  derived  from  a selection  dynamic  that 
satisfies  (LM)  that  begins  from  a  totally  mixed  initial  condition,  for  any 
E >  0  there  exists  a  T sufficiently  large  so that  if t >  T, then  x(t)  is an  s-best 418  CABRALES  AND  SOBEL 
response  to  an  average  of past  population  strategies.  Hence  the  sequence 
(x(t)}  is  consistent  with  adaptive  learning.” 
In  view  of  Proposition  2,  it  is  a  simple  matter  to  prove  the  discrete 
analog  of Samuelson  and  Zhang’s  Theorem  2. 
PROPOSITION  3.  Let  (F, G)  be  a regular,  aggregate  log  monotonic  selec- 
tion  dynamic.  Let  x’  E SnlfaiZ  strict  iterated  admissibility.  Zf (x(t),  y(t))  is an 
evolutionary  path  with  (x(O),  y(0))  completely  mixed,  there  exists  a function 
v(t)  with  lim,  _ m v(t)  =  0  such  that  for  every  t,  there  exists  a pure  strategy 
i(t)  in  the  C(x’)  such that  xi(,) <  v(t).  A similar  statement  holds for  a strategy 
of player  2  that  fails  strict  iterated  admissibility. 
Proposition  3  differs  from  Samuelson  and  Zhang’s  Theorem  2  in  only 
two  respects:  It  treats  discrete  rather  than  continuous  dynamics;  and  it 
assumes  (LM)  rather  than  (AM).  Samuelson-Zhang’s  proof  can  be 
adapted  to  the  discrete  context  with  only  small  changes.  We  choose  to 
present  a  proof  based  on  Proposition  2,  rather  than  the  direct  proof  of 
Samuelson  and  Zhang  in  order  to  establish  that  limit  points  of the  dynamic 
must  be  best  responses  to  averages  of past  strategies. 
Proof:  Let  (x(t),  y(t))  be  an  evolutionary  path  with  (x(O),  y(0)) 
completely  mixed.  Let  P  be  the  set  of limit  points  of  {x(t)>  and  Q  be  the 
set  of limit  points  of  (y(t)}.  Define  sets A,  and  A,  by 
A,  =  (~4  ES”’  : u fails  SIA  and  there  exists x*  E P  such that  C(U) c  C(x*)} 
and 
It  suffices  to  show  that  A,  u  A,  is  empty.  We  will  assume  instead  that 
A,  u  A2  is  not  empty  and  argue  to  a  contradiction.  For  a’ E A,  u  AI,  let 
K(d)  be  such  that  a’ E MIK~a~~\MIK~o~~+ 1  or  a’ E M2K~a~~\MZK~o~~  + I, 
depending  on  whether  a’ E S”’  or  Sff2. Let  a  be  a  minimizer  of  K( -)  on 
lo x(t)  may  place  positive  probability  on  pure.  strategies  that  fail  to  be  s-best  responses  to 
population  strategies.  Consequently  discrete  selection  dynamics  that  satisfy  (LM)  are  consis- 
tent  with  adaptive  learning  if  we  take  our  strategy  set  to  be  the  entire  simplex  of  mixed 
strategies.  They  need  not  be  consistent  with  adaptive  learning  if  we  limit  attention  to  pure 
strategies.  As  we  think  of  population  strategies  x(t)  as  arising  from  individuals  playing  pure 
strategies,  some  of  the  individuals  may  never  bc  consistent  with  adaptive  learning  since  they 
could  bc  playing  pure  strategies  that  are  not  s-best  responses  to  the  population’s  strategy. 
However,  the  proportion  of  players  that  are  not  using  s-best  responses  goes  to  zero  as  time 
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A,  u  Al,  and  let  k =  K(a).  Without  loss  of generality,  assume  a E A I . Since 
~~Mlk\Mlk+l~  there  exists  b E Mlk  such  that 
~,(a,  Y)--n,(h  Y)<O  for  all  y E M,,  (14) 
or,  in  words,  b strictly  dominates  a  relative  to  M,,.  Let  Y  consist  of  all 
those  y E Snz such  that  yj >  0  only  if jE  MZk.  It  follows  from  (14)  that 
~,(a,  y)-n,(b,  y)<O  for  all  YE  Y.  (15) 
Since  k  is  a minimum  of K( . ), 
lim  y,(t)=0  for  j$Mzk.  (16)  r-m 
By  Proposition  2  and  the  definition  of  a  we  know  that  there  exists  a 
subsequence  { tn}  such  that  a  responds  optimally  to  j,  where 
y=lim  n-t co  C>:,i  B(t;  t,)  y(t)  for  positive  weights  P(t;  t,),  t =  0,  1, .  .  .  . t,, 
b(t;  t,)<K/t,,  and  CF:,’  /?(I;  t,)=  1.  From  (16)  and  b(t;  t,)  6  K/t,,  for 
t =  0,  1, .  ..) t,  it  follows  that  jj  =  0 for j$  M,,.  Therefore,  jj  E Y. Hence  (15) 
implies  that  a  cannot  be  an  optimal  response  to  J;  the  contradiction 
completes  the  proof. 
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